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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 21.1985, a field auditor for the Utah Department of Employment 
Security ( hereinafter "D£.S." ) determined that Mr. John R. James, who was hired as 
an independent contractor by Allen U Associates Membership Development Company 
( hereinafter "Allen & Associates"), was an employee under the Utah Unemployment 
Security Act and that the services performed by Mr. James were subject to 
unemployment insurance coverage. (R. 33 - 38 ). Allen & Associates appealed the 
decision via a letter dated November 27,1983. (R. 32 - 34 ). The letter was received by 
the DJE.S. on December 12,1983. Thereafter, a notice of hearing, dated January 16, 
1985 was sent to Allen & Associates by certified mail. An administrative law judge 
rendered a decision which affirmed the field auditors findings on January 29,1986. 
(R. 23 and 26 ). Allen & Associates then sent a letter of appeal dated February 12, 
1986 requesting a rescheduling of the previous hearing. (R. 22 - 24 ). A telephone 
hearing took place on March 17,1986 (R. 13 -18 ) and the administrative law judge 
determined that Allen & Associates failed to attend the hearing of January 29,1986 
without good cause. (R. 11 and 12 ). Allen & Associates thereafter requested an 
appeal from the Board of Review of the D£.S. by a letter dated April 3,1986. ( R I O ) . 
The Board of Review convened and considered the request for review on April 22, 
1986. (R. 7 and 8 ). The Board affirmed the administrative law judges findings that 
Mr. James was an employee under the Unemployment Security Act. (R. 3 and 6 ) . A 
petition for a writ of review and the appearance of petitioner's counsel was filed with 
this court on June 19,1986. (R. 3 ). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The petitioner, Allen & Associates, is engaged in the business of getting local 
enterprises to join area chambers of commerce. They are a Houston, Texas-based 
corporation but have offices in various other states as well. A Salt Lake City office 
was set up for the purpose of increasing the membership of the Salt Lake Area 
Chamber of Commerce. Allen & Associates' normal business operations include the 
hiring of an office manager to act as a liaison between Allen ^Associates and the 
particular chamber of commerce. Independent contractors are then recruited for 
the purpose of selling business memberships for the chamber of commerce. These 
independent contractors are usually paid a commission on the memberships they sell. 
No unemployment insurance is withheld from the commissions earned by these 
individuals. 
On December 12,1984, John R. James (hereinafter "James") and Allen & 
Associates entered into a written contractual agreement whereby James was to solicit 
business memberships for the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce. (R. 48). The 
contract stated that the relationship between Allen & Associates and James was that of 
an independent contractor. Furthermore, James was to use his own methods and 
means for implementing the sales of memberships. (R. 48 ). James was to be paid a 
commission ranging from 25 - 40% of the membership dues sold by him. The contract 
also stated that payments of commissions were to be made every week subject to a 
weekly ten dollar deduction for administrative costs incurred by Allen U Associates. 
(R. 43 - 47 ). James was expressly informed that he was solely liable for all Social 
Security and Withholding taxes as it was not Allen & Associates' obligation to report 
such withholdings of independent contractors. (R. 48 ). Allen & Associates retained 
the right of termination should complaints be received from clients regarding James' 
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activity or should James fail to produce a sufficient number of new membership sales 
although no quota was agreed upon or mentioned. In addition, the contract contained 
a non-competition clause whereby James agreed not to hire any employee or 
subcontractor of Allen & Associates. James was further required not to compete with 
Allen U Associates for a one-year period following the expiration of his contract. (R. 
48). 
Upon procurring a "better job/' James voluntarily quit working as an 
independent contractor for Allen U Associates on or about March 1,1983- (R. 42). 
Several days before, on February 26,1983, James signed an affidavit stating that he 
did and had always considered himself to be an independent contractor, and not an 
employee, while working for Allen & Associates. (R. 44 ). The main provisions of the 
affidavit stated that the methods and techniques used by James in making 
membership sales were left to his judgment and discretion. (R. 44). Also, no working 
hours were set by Allen & Associates; James could work whenever he wanted. 
Furthermore, Allen & Associates did not set any required number of hours to be 
worked. Lastly, the affidavit stated that Allen & Associates did not monitor 
salespersons' activities except to determine the number of sales for the purpose of 
compensation. ( R. 43 ). 
On September 9,1983, James filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the 
Utah Department of Employment Security. (R. 43 ). The D£.S. required that both 
Allen & Associates and James fill out questionnaires regarding James' status as an 
employee. (R. 39 - 41). On November 21,1983, a DJE.S. field auditor concluded that 
James performed services in employment under the Utah Employment Security Act 
partly because James performed approximately 30% of his services at Allen & 
Associates place of business. Therefore, Allen & Associates was responsible for 
making contributions based on the amount of payments made to James. ( R. 33 - 38 ). 
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This decision was subsequently affirmed by an administrative law judge and Review 
Board of the D£.S. whereupon this petition for review was sought. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The standard of review for this Court is to determine whether the Review 
Board acted reasonably and rationally in determining that Mr. James was not an 
independent contractor. Mr. James' services should be excluded from the 
Unemployment Compensation Act because the petitioner. Allen & Associates, satisfied 
the requirements of U.C.A. § 33 - 4 - 22 (j) (3) (1933 as amended). The petitioner did 
not exercise control over the performance of the contractor. The services performed 
by the contractor were outside the usual course of business or performed outside the 
place of business of the petitioner. Also, the contractor had a right to independently 
establish a business of the same nature as that involved in the contract for hire. 
Furthermore, the petitioner satisfied the requirements of U.C.A. S 35 - 4 - 22 
(r) (1953 as amended) because the contractor was a salesman who was paid a straight 
commission and who performed his services outside the petitioner's place of business. 
Therefore, because the petitioner fully met the requirements of the above statutes. 
Mr. James should be considered an independent contractor and the petitioner should 
not be required to pay unemployment compensation insurance on the commissions 
paid to Mr. James. 
ARGUMENT 
I. OVERVIEW OF STATUTES INVOLVED 
The state legislature enacted a very broad definition of 'employment" under 
the Unemployment Compensation Act codified in U.C.A. § 35 - 4 - 22 (j) (1) (1953). 
"Employment" means any service performed . . . after December 31.1971 . . . 
for wages or under any contract of hire written or oral, express or implied. 
A business which hires an individual who meets this definition of employment must 
contribute to the state unemployment compensation fund. 
Petitioner does not question that James met this definition of employment 
because he performed his services after December 31,1971, was under a written 
contract for hire, and received "wages" in the form of commissions; thus, satisfying 
the definition of wages under U.C.A. § 33 - 4 - 22 (p) (1933 ficSupp. 1983). 
The legislature did, however, provide for two exceptions where a business is 
exempted from paying into the unemployment compensation fund, even if the hired 
individual satisfies the "employment" definition of the above statute. The first 
exception is stated in U.C.A. S 33 - 4 - 22 (j) (3) (1933 & Supp. 1983) and is generally 
referred to as the "ABC" test. 
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any contract of 
hire . . . shall be deemed to be employment... unless... 
(A) Such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or 
direction over the performance of such services both under his contract 
for hire and in fact; 
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course of business or such 
service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise 
for which such service is performed; and 
(C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an independently 
established . . . occupation . . . of the same nature as that involved in the 
contract of service. 
(emphasis added). 
The second exception is codified in U.C.A. §33-4-22 (r) (1953 & Supp. 1983). 
. . . the term "employment" shall not include services as an outside salesman 
paid solely by way of commission, and such services must have been 
performed outside of all places of business of the enterprise for which 
such services are performed. 
II. PETITIONERS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE UNEMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
UNDER 3 5 - 4 - 2 2 (j) (5). 
The purpose of Section 35 - 4 - 22 (j) (5) is to exclude employers from the 
operation of the Act when they have hired individuals who are independent contrac-
tors. The statute sets up a three-part test for determining who are independent con-
tractors under the Unemployment Compensation Act. 
Petitioners agree that all three Sections, "A" - "C\ of 35 - 4 - 22 (j) (5) must be 
satisfied if the services rendered for them are to be excluded from the Act. Leach v 
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. Dep't of Employment Sec, 123 Utah 423,260 P. 2d 
744(1953). 
The appropriate standard of review over the findings of the Review Board is 
codified in U.C.A. S 35 - 4 -10 (i) (1953 as amended). 
In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the 
commission and the board of review as to the facts if supported by evidence 
shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to 
questions of law. 
This Court has determined that the standard of review is an "intermediate" standard 
and the decision of the Review Board is entitled to weight but must be within the 
limits of reasonableness or rationality. Barney v. Department of Employment Sec. 
681 P. 2d 1273,1275 (Utah 19S4). 
A. THE PETITIONER DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE PERFORMANCE OF 
THE CONTRACTOR, JOHN JAMES. 
The first test under section 35 - 4 - 22 (j) (5) is whether the employer exercised 
control over the performance of the contractors services both under the contract for 
hire and in fact. U.C.A. § 35 - 4 - 22 (j) (5) (A) (1953 as amended). The crux of this test 
is whether the employer controlled the means by which the work was accomplished. 
In Strieker v. Industrial Commn. 55 Utah 603,188 P. 849 (1920). this Court determined 
that an independent contractor was one that represented the will of his employer 
only as to the result of the work, and not as to the means by which it was 
accomplished. Thus, the whole issue of determining an independent contractor status 
was resolved by looking at the degree of control over the contractor s performance. 
The petitioner did not reserve the right of control over James' performance 
under the contract for hire. Paragraph three of the contract clearly states that" the 
contractor shall use his/her own methods and means for implementing the sales of 
membership.'' (R. 48 ). 
One might argue that the petitioner did exercise control under the contract 
for hire because of the right of termination over the contractor in paragraph six. 
(R. 48). However, this Court resolved this question in Barney v. Department of 
Employment Sec, 681 P. 2d 1273 (Utah 1984). by concluding that an employer who 
reserves a right of termination over an individual, if dissatisfied with the individual's 
work, did not. standing alone, reveal any evidence of control over performance. 
Paragraph eight of the contract for hire required James not hire any Allen & 
Associates' employee or subcontractor to aid him in the performance of his services 
and not compete with the petitioner in Salt Lake County for one year after the 
contract expired. (R. 48 ). This provision does not evidence a right of control over 
the performance of James' services. James was free to hire as many subordinates as 
he desired as long as they were not the petitioner's employees. Furthermore, by 
including the non-competition clause, the petitioner sought to protect the 
relationship with its client. Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce. James could have 
freely worked for any parallel business organization. (R. 23 ). 
Allen & Associates did not exercise any control over James' performance 
under the contract for hire. In determining the status of an independent contractor. 
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the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that it was the existence of the right or 
authority to interfere or control which renders one an employee rather than an 
independent contractor. Wallis v. Secretary of Kansas Dep't of Human Resources, 236 
Kan. 97,689 P.2d 787 (1984). Under this test, James would be considered an 
independent contractor because the petitioner did not have the right or authority to 
control James' performance. 
Furthermore, the petitioner did not exercise control" in fact" over James* 
performance as required by subsection "A" under 33 - 4 - 22 (j) (3). This Court, in 
Superior Cablevision v industrial frnnmn 688 P.2d 444 (Utah 1984), looked at several 
factors which went beyond the contract of employment to determine whether an 
employer exercised control over a contractors performance. This Court concluded 
that cable vision wire installers were employees because Superior effectively 
controlled their working days, hours, and salary. Id. at 447. 
Other courts have looked at similar factors. In Department of Employment v. 
Brown Brothers Constr.. Inc.. 100 Idaho 479,600 P 2d 783 (1979), the Idaho Supreme 
Court determined that "tree falters" were independent contractors because each man 
was completely free to do the job as he saw fit, to set his own hours and days, and to 
hire subordinates to assist him. 
The Brown Brothers Constr. case is precisely analogous to the instant case in 
that James solicited new members as he saw fit to do, had complete control over his 
working days and hours, was free to hire subordinates as long as they were not 
petitioners employees, and was paid a commission rather than an hourly rate. That 
James usually worked normal business hours is immaterial; this was the only time 
most businesses could be reached and was not a requirement issued by Allen U 
Associates. The notion that an independent contractors hours must be flexible does 
not mean that he must be able to perform his services twenty-four hours a day. 
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Given the above circumstances, Allen & Associates did not exercise control over 
James* performance, and, therefore, satisfies the first test under 33 - 4 - 22 (j) (3). 
B. THE SERVICE PERFORMED BY THE CONTRACTOR, JOHN JAMES, WAS OUTSIDE 
THE USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS OR PERFORMED OUTSIDE ALL THE PLACES 
OF BUSINESS. 
Subsection "B" of section 33 - 4 - 22 (j) (3) sets up two alternatives, one of 
which must be met in order to exclude services rendered to an employer under the 
Act. In Bigfoofs. Inc. v. Board of Review of the Indus. Commn. Deo't of Employment 
Sec. 710 P.2d 180 (Utah 1983), this Court quoted the earlier decision of Utah Hotel Co. v. 
Industrial Commn. 107 Utah 24,131 P2d 467 (1944), and concluded that itinerant 
bands and entertainers performing at bars and private clubs fall within subsection 
"B." This Court reasoned that the services performed were not outside" the place of 
business" because contracts specifically provided that the services be rendered in the 
place of business. 
Earlier, in Barney v. Department of Employment Sec, 681 P.2d 1273 (Utah 
1984), this Court refused to adopt a job-site definition of "place of business" because it 
ignored the possibility of one conducting ones work at home. Barney involved a 
determination of whether" drywall nailers," who worked at construction sites and 
had home offices, were independent contractors. The result of the opinion was that 
individuals, who worked both at home and at the" place of business" of the employer, 
were considered independent contractors under the Unemployment Compensation 
Act. Applying the Barney rule to the instant case, one finds that the " place of 
business" definition is not so broad as to prohibit independent contractors from 
performing any services at the employers place of business. Therefore, the fact that 
James may have performed approximately 30% of his services at Allen & Associates' 
Salt Lake office is immaterial. 
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The petitioner has satisfied the first alternative of subsection "B" because the 
contract for hire did not require that James perform his services at the Salt Lake City 
office. James was free to perform his servicess anywhere, including his home. No 
restrictions of any kind were placed upon him. 
The petitioner has also satisfied the second alternative because the services 
rendered by James were " outside the usual course of business" for which such 
service is performed. Allen & Associates is engaged in membership development for 
area chambers of commerce; the complexities and intricacies of such a business go 
beyond the mere selling of memberships. 
C. THE CONTRACTOR, JOHN JAMES, WAS INDEPENDENTLY ESTABLISHED IN A 
BUSINESS OF THE SAME NATURE AS THAT INVOLVED IN THE CONTRACT OF 
SERVICE. 
In Leach v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. Dep't of Employment Sec, 123 
Utah 423,260 P.2d 744 (1953), this Court reiterated an earlier finding that the T test 
is satisfied if the business or trade was established independently of the employer and 
the employee was engaged in the independent business at the time of rendering the 
service involved. This doctrine was later expanded in North American Builders, Inc. 
v. Unemployment Compensation Div.. Dent of Employment Sec. 22 Utah 2d 338,433 P 
2d 142 (1969), wherein this Court found that employee status is not established simply 
because one is left without work at the termination of ones services. IdL, 433 P 2d at 
143. Similarly, the Court determined that an independently established business is 
one which survives the termination of the employer/employee relationship and its 
continued existence does not depend on a relationship with any one employer. 
Superior Cablevision Installers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n. 68 P.2d 444,447 (Utah 
1984). 
As a practical matter, whether an independently established business exists 
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hinges on such factors as whether tools and equipment were supplied by the 
employer, whether the service took place solely on the employers premises, and 
whether the employee had a business license. 
In view of these factors, the instant case clearly points to an independent 
contractor relationship. First. James was not required to use any special tools because 
of the nature of the business. He was. however, required to carry his own automobile 
liability insurance as of the date of hire. (R. 48 ). An automobile is usually the only 
type of special equipment a salesperson requires. The requirement, by contract, that 
James provide his own insurance coverage clearly indicates that James owned his 
own equipment. 
Second, it has already been established that James was not required nor 
encouraged to perform his services from the Salt Lake City office. (R. 32). James was 
free to solicit memberships for the Chamber from any location he desired, including 
his own home. 
The third factor is inapplicable in the instant case because of the nature of 
the trade. As a general rule, salespersons rarely, if ever, have business licenses. 
Further, in the Barney case, this Court concluded that the existence of a business 
license did not determine the independent nature of the trade where there is no 
distinction between a specialist who holds a license and one who does not. I<L at 
1273-76. 
The "C" test should be read to mean that the contractor had a right to 
independently establish a business of the same nature as that involved in the con-
tract for service. The present reading of the statute reults in a finding that 
independent contractors are employees when they have just started a business or 
occupation and work for only one employer. Therefore, the focus of this test should 
be on whether the contractor had a right to independently establish a business as 
opposed to whether he actually did or not. 
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James was free at all times to work for any parallel business organization. 
(R. 33 ). Whether he chose to or not was of his own volition. The only minor 
restriction placed on James was that of not allowing him to directly compete with 
petitioners only client. Being an independent contractor does not require one to 
directly or indirectly compete for a business' clients. Surely, it was not the intention 
of the legislature to allow an independent contractor to collect unemployment 
compensation as a result of failing to take advantage of various business 
opportunities. For the above reasons and mainly because James had a right to 
independently establish a business of the same nature as petitioner's, the "C" test has 
been satisfied. 
III. CHANGES IN 35 - 4 - 22 (j) (3) 
For the above stated reasons the petitioner has been satisfied the "ABC" test 
and therefore the services rendered by James should be excluded from the Act. 
Recently, however, the legislature simplified the "ABC" test into an "AB" test by drop-
ping the requirement of subsection "B" in the old statute. U.C.A. S 33 - 4 - 22 (j) (3) 
(1933&Supp. 1986). Thus, under both the new and old statutes James* services would 
be excluded from the Act because th new test is easier to comply with. 
IV. PETITIONERS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE UNEMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
UNDER 3 3 - 4 - 2 2 ( r ) . 
Additionally, James' services should be excluded under the Act because he 
satisfies the provisions of U.C.A. § 35 - 4 - 22 (r) (1933 fcSupp. 1986). This statute 
requires that the services be performed by an outside salesman paid solely by way of 
commissions and that the services be performed" outside the place of business" of 
the employer. The contract for hire clearly specified that James was a salesman and 
was paid by way of commissions. (R. 48 ). Furthermore, this Court in Barney 
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determined that the "place of business" definition did not exclude individuals from 
being independent contractors merely because they performed some services at the 
employers location. Therefore, because James was paid soley by way of commission 
and performed his services outside petitioner's place of business, James' services 
should be excluded from the Act under this provision. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should find that the decision of the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission be reversed. The decision is against the weight of evidence 
and is therefore unreasonable when applying the intermediate standard of review 
demanded in cases such as this. The contractor's services should be excluded under 
the Unemployment Compensation Act because the petitioner has satisfied the "ABC" 
test in Section 33 - 4 - 22 (j) (3) as well as the provision of Section 33-4-22 (r). 
Satisfying either is sufficient to exclude the contractor's services under the Act. For 
all of the foregoing reasons, the Review Board decision requiring the petitioner to 
contribute unemployment compensation insurance should be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted this 1st day of September, 1986. 
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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35-4-22 LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
going, or t he legal representa t ive of a deceased person, which has or 
subsequen t t o J a n u a r y 1, 1935, h a d one or more individuals pe r fo rming 
services for i t wi th in th is s ta te . 
(1) All i nd iv idua l s per forming services wi th in th is s t a t e for a n y em-
ploy ing un i t which ma in ta ins two or more sepa ra t e es tabl i shments wi th in 
th i s s t a t e shall be deemed to be per forming services for a single employ ing 
uni t for all t h e purposes of this act. 
(2) E a c h ind iv idua l employed to perform or to assist in pe r fo rming 
the w o r k of a n y person in the service of an employing un i t shall be deemed 
to be engaged by such employing un i t for al l the purposes of this ac t 
w h e t h e r such ind iv idua l was hired or paid d i rec t ly by such employing un i t 
or by such person, p rov ided the employing uni t had ac tua l or cons t ruc t ive 
knowledge of t he w o r k . 
(3) " H o s p i t a l " means an inst i tut ion which has been licensed, certified 
or app roved by t h e Utah s ta te heal th division as a hospi ta l . 
(4) ( A ) " Ins t i t u t ion of h igher educat ion," for the purposes of this 
sect ion, m e a n s an educa t iona l ins t i tu t ion which : 
( i) Admi t s , as r e g u l a r s tuden ts only, indiv iduals h a v i n g a certif icate 
of g r a d u a t i o n from a high school, or the recognized equivalent of such a 
ce r t i f i ca te ; 
( i i ) I s l ega l ly au thor ized in th is s t a t e to p rov ide a p r o g r a m of educa-
t ion beyond h igh school ; 
( i i i) P r o v i d e s an educat ional p r o g r a m for which it a w a r d s a bache-
lor 's or h ighe r degree , or provides a p rogram which is acceptable for full 
c red i t t o w a r d such a degree , a p rog ram of pos t -g radua te or post -doctora l 
s tudies , or a p r o g r a m of t r a in ing to p repa re s tuden t s for gainful employ-
m e n t in a recognized occupa t ion ; and 
( iv) Ts a publ ic or o ther nonprofit inst i tut ion. 
(B) All colleges and universi t ies in this s ta te a re ins t i tu t ions of h ighe r 
educat ion for purposes of this section. 
( i ) " E m p l o y e r " m e a n s : 
(1) A n y employ ing un i t which paid wages d u r i n g a ca lendar q u a r t e r 
in e i ther t h e c u r r e n t or preceding ca lendar y e a r for employment amount -
ing to $140 or more a n d a n y employing uni t subject to the F e d e r a l Un-
employment T a x Act , o r which, as a condit ion for approva l of this act for 
full t ax c red i t aga ins t the tax imposed by the F e d e r a l Unemployment T a x 
Act , is r equ i r ed , pu r suan t to such act, to be an "employe r" u n d e r this act . 
(2) A n y employing uni t which, hav ing become an employer u n d e r 
p a r a g r a p h ( 1 ) , has not , u n d e r sections 35-4-8 and 35-4-5, ceased to be 
an employer sub jec t to th is a c t ; or, 
(3) F o r t he effective per iod of i ts election p u r s u a n t to section 35-4-8 
(c) a n y o the r employing un i t which has elected to become fully sub jec t 
to th i s act. 
( j ) (1) " E m p l o y m e n t " means any service performed p r io r to J a n u a r y 
1, 1972, which w a s employment as defined in the Utah Unemployment 
Compensat ion L a w pr ior to the effective da te of this act , and subject to 
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the o ther provisions of this subsection, service performed af ter Decembi 
31 , 1971, inc luding service in in te r s t a te commerce, and service as an office 
of a corpora t ion per formed for wages or unde r a n y con t rac t of hire wri t te 
or oral , express or implied. 
(2) " E m p l o y m e n t " shall include an indiv idual ' s en t i re service pe 
formed within or both wi th in and wi thou t th is s ta te if: 
(A) The service is localized in th is s t a t e ; 
(B) The service is not localized in any s ta te but some of the servic 
is performed in th is s t a t e and the ind iv idua l ' s base of opera t ions , or, i 
there is no base of opera t ions , the place from which such service is di 
reeted or control led, is in th is s t a t e ; or the individual ' s base of operat ion 
or place from which such service is directed or controlled is not in an; 
s ta le in which some p a r t of the service is performed but the indiv idual ' 
residence is in th is s t a t e ; 
(C) The service is per formed en t i re ly outs ide this s t a t e and is no 
localized in a n y s ta te , t he w o r k e r is one of a class of employees who a n 
requ i red to t r ave l outs ide th is s t a t e in per formance of the i r dut ies , anc 
the base of opera t ions is in th is s t a t e or, if there is no base of opera t ions 
the place from which the service is d i rec ted or control led is in th is s ta te 
(D) (i) The service is per formed af ter December 31, 1971, by an indi-
vidual in the employ of this s t a t e or a n y of i ts ins t rumenta l i t i es or in the 
employ of th is s t a t e and one or more o ther s ta tes or their ins t rumenta l i t ies , 
for a hospi ta l or ins t i tu t ion of h igher educat ion as defined in section 
35-4-22 (h) (3) and (4 ) , located in th is s ta te . A n y polit ical subdivision shall 
make paymen t s in lieu of con t r ibu t ions with respect to such employment 
as p rov ided wi th respect to nonprofit o rganiza t ions in section 35-4-7.5 (b) 
and (e) ; 
( i i) The service is performed af ter December 31 , 1972, in the employ 
of this s ta te , except service per formed as an elected official, or service as 
a member of a board, council , or commission when such member is com-
pensated on a pe r diem basis. Willi respect to the cost of benefits paid on 
the basis of such employment , t he s t a t e shall make pa \ merits in lieu of 
cont r ibut ions in accordance with the p ro \ isions of section 35-4-7.5 (b) and 
(K) The service is per formed after December 31 , 1971, by an individ-
ual in t h e employ of a rel igious, char i tab le , educat ional , or o ther organi-
zation, bu t only if: 
( i ) The service is exc luded from "employmen t " as defined in the 
Federa l Unemployment T a x Act solely by reason of section 3306(c) (8) 
of t h a t a c t ; a n d 
(ii) The organiza t ion had four or more individuals in employment 
for some por t ion of a d a y in each of t w e n t y different weeks, whe the r or 
not such weeks were consecut ive, wi th in e i ther the cur ren t or preceding 
ca l enda r year , r egard less of w h e t h e r they were employed a t the same 
moment of t ime. 
( F ) (i) The same is per formed outside the United Sta tes , Canada, 
and the Vi rg in I s lands by an ind iv idua l who is a citizen of the United 
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States after December 31, 1971, in the employ of an American employer, 
other than service which is deemed "employment" under the provisions 
of subparagraph (2) of this subsection or the parallel provisions of another 
state's law, if: 
(aa) The employer's principal place of business in the United States 
is located in this s ta te ; 
(bb) The employer has no place of business in the United States but 
is an individual who is a resident of this state, a corporation which is 
organized under the laws of this state, or a partnership or trust in which 
the number of partners or trustees who are residents of this state is greater 
than the number who are residents of any one other state; or 
(cc) None of the criteria of divisions (aa) and (bb) of this subpara-
graph is met but the employer has elected coverage in this state or the 
employer having failed to elect coverage in any state, the individual has 
filed a claim for benefits, based on such service, under the law of this state. 
(ii) An "American employer" for purposes of this paragraph, means 
a person who is an individual who is a resident of the United States, a 
partnership if two-thirds or more of the partners are residents of the 
United States, a trust if all of the trustees are residents of the United 
States, or a corporation organized under the laws of the United States 
or of any s ta te ; 
(G) The service is performed after December 31, 1971, by an officer 
or member of the crew of an American vessel on or in connection with 
such vessel and the operating office from which the operations of such 
vessel, operating on navigable waters within, or within and without, the 
United States, are ordinarily and regularly supervised, managed, directed 
and controlled is within this s tate; 
(II) A tax with respect to such service in this state is required to be 
paid under any federal law imposing a tax against which credit may be 
taken for contributions required to be paid into a state unemployment 
fund or which, as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed 
by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, is required to be covered under 
this act; or 
(I) (i) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (r) of this sec-
tion, the service is performed: 
(aa) As an agent-driver or commission-driver engaged in distributing 
mejit products, vegetable products, fruit products, bakery products, bev-
erages other than milk, or laundry or dry-cleaning services, for his prin-
cipal; or 
(bb) As a traveling or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver 
or commission-driver, engaged on a full-time basis in the solicitation on 
behalf of and the transmission to his principal, except for sideline sales 
activities on behalf of some other person, of orders from wholesalers, re-
tailers, contractors, or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other similar 
establishments for merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their busi-
ness operations. 
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(ii) The term "employment" as used in this paragraph shall include 
services described in (aa) and (bb) above, performed after December 31, 
1!)71, only if: 
(aa) The contract of service contemplates that substantially all of 
the services are to be performed personally by such individual; 
(bb) The individual does not have a substantial investment in facili-
ties used in connection with the performance of the services other than 
in facilities for transportation; and 
(cc) The services arc not in the nature of a single transaction that is 
not part of a continuing relationship with the person for whom the services 
are performed. 
(3) (A) Services covered by an election pursuant to sections 35-4-8(c) 
and 35-4-8.5, and 
(B) Services covered by an arrangement pursuant to section 35-4-21 
between the commission and the agency charged with the administration 
of any other state or federal unemployment compensation law, pursuant 
to which all services performed by an individual for an employing unit 
are deemed to be performed entirely within this state, shall be deemed 
to be employment if the commission has approved an election of the em-
ploying unit for whom such services are performed, pursuant to which 
the entire service of such individual during the period covered by such 
election is deemed to be insured work. 
(4) Service shall be deemed to be localized within a state if: 
(A) The service is performed entirely within such state; or 
(B) The service is performed both within and without such state, bu1 
the service performed without such state is incidental to the individual's 
service within the state, for example, is temporary or transitory in nature 
or consists of isolated transactions. 
(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any con 
tract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to b 
employment subject to this act unless and until it is shown to the sath 
faction of the commission that : 
(A) Such individual has been and will continue to be free from coi 
trol or direction over the performance of such services, both under h 
contract of hire and in fact; 
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course of the business f< 
which such service is performed or that such service is performed outsh 
of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service 
performed; and 
(C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an independently esta 
lished trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as t t 
involved in the contract of service. 
((>) Provided that such services are also exempted under the Fede 
Unemployment Tax Act as amended, the term "employment" shall i 
include: 
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employment of individuals attached to their regular jobs, and olher forms 
of short-time work, as the commission deems necessary. 
(2) The commission in its discretion may by regulation prescribe, 
in the case of individuals working on a regular attachment basis, the 
existence of unemployment for periods longer than a week, provided, that 
(i) it is a period of less than full-time work; (ii) in so far as possible 
the loss of wages required as a condition of being deemed "unemployed" in 
such periods shall be such as to allow comparable benefits, for comparable 
loss in wages, to those individuals working less than full-time in each week 
as would be payable on a weekly claim period basis to those individuals 
working full-time and not at all in alternate weeks; and (iii) unemploy-
ment shall in no case be measured on a basis of longer than a half-month 
period. 
(n) "State" includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 
(0) "Employment security administration fund" means the employ-
ment security adminislrafion fund established by section 35-4-14, and from 
which administrative expenses under this act shall be paid. 
(p) "Wages" means all enumeration for personal services, including 
commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any 
medium other than cash. Gratuities customarily received by an individual 
in the course of his employment from persons other than his employing unit 
shall be treated as wages received from his employing unit. The reason-
able cash value of remuneration in any medium other than cash and the 
reasonable amount of gratuities shall be estimated and determined in 
accordance with rules prescribed by the commission; provided, that the 
term "wages" shall not include: 
(1) For the purpose of section 35-4 7, that part of the remuneration 
which after remuneration equal to $3,000 has been paid to an individual 
by an employer with respect to employment subject to this act during 
any calendar year prior to calendar year 1064 and that part of the re-
muneration which, after remuneration equal to $4,200 has been paid to an 
individual by an employer with respect to employment during calendar 
year lf)f>4 and any calendar year thereafter, is paid to such individual 
by such employer during such calendar year, provided, however, that for 
the purposes of this subsection remuneration over $1,200 shall be deemed 
to be wages subject to contribution to the same extent that such remunera-
tion is defined as wages by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act as amended. 
If an employer (hereinafter referred to as successor employer) during 
any calendar year acquires substantially all the property used in a trade 
or business of another employer (hereinafter referred to as a predecessor), 
or used in a separate unit of a trade or business of a predecessor, and 
immediately after the acquisition emplo^ys in his trade or business an in-
dividual who immediately prior to the acquisition was employed in the 
trade or business of such predecessor, then, for the purpose of determining 
whether the successor employer has paid remuneration with respect to em-
ployment equal to the applicable taxable wages as defined by this subsec-
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tion, to such individual during such calendar year, any remuneration w 
respect to employment paid to such individual by such predecessor dur 
such calendar year and prior to such acquisitions shall be considered 
having been paid by such successor employer. 
(2) The amount of any payment with respect to services perforn 
after December 31, 1940, to, or on behalf of, an individual in its emp] 
under a plan or system established by an employing unit which mal 
provisions for individuals in its employ generally or for a class or classes 
such individuals (including any amount paid by an employing unit i 
insurance or annuities, or into a fund, to provide for any such paymen 
on account of (A) retirement, or (B) sickness or accident disability, 
(C) medical and hospitalization expenses in connection with sickness 
accidental disability, or (D) death, provided the individual in its empl 
(i) has not the option to receive, instead of provision for such death ben 
fit, any part of such payment or, if such death benefit is insured, ai 
part of the premiums (or contributions to premiums) paid by his emplo 
ing unit, and (ii) has not the right, under the provisions of the plan < 
system or policy of insurance providing for such death benefit, to assig 
such benefit, or to receive a cash consideration in lieu of such benefit eith< 
upon his withdrawal from the plan or system providing for such benef 
or upon termination of such plan or system or policy of insurance or of h 
services with such employing unit. 
(3) The payment by an employing unit (without deduction from th 
remuneration of the individual in its employ) of the tax imposed upon a 
individual in its employ under section 3101 of the Federal Internal Revenu 
Code with respect to services performed after December 31, 1040; or 
(4) Dismissal payments after December 31, 1940, which the employing 
unit is not legally required to make. 
(q) "Week" means such period or periods of seven consecutive calen 
dar days as the commission may by regulation prescribe. 
(r) Unless services would constitute employment at common Jaw, tin 
term "employment" shall not include services as an outside salesman paid 
solely by way of commission, and such services must have been performed 
outside of all places of business of the enterprises for which such services 
are performed. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 40, § 19; C. 1943, 
42-2a-19; L. 1943, ch. 51, § 1 ; 1947, ch. 
59, § 1; 1949, ch. 53, § 1; 1959, ch. 57, § 1 ; 
1961, ch. 73, § 1 ; 1963, ch. 52, § 1 ; 1971, 
ch. 78, § 9 ; 1972, ch. 8, § 1 . 
Compiler's Notes . 
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act, re-
ferred to in this section, is compiled in the 
United S ta tes Code as Tit . 26, §§ 3301-3311. 
Section 3304 of the Federa l In te rna l 
Revenue Code, referred to in subd. ( j ) (6) 
(f t) , is compiled in the United S ta tes Code 
as Tit . 26, §3301 . 
The definition of terms for the Railroad 
Unemployment Insurance Act, referred to 
in subd. ( j ) (6) (O), is compiled in the 
United S ta tes Code as Tit . 45, § 3 5 1 . 
Sections 401 ( a ) , 501, 521 and 3101 of 
the Federal In te rna l Revenue Code, re-
ferred to in this section, are compiled in 
the United Sta tes Code as Tit . 26, §§ 401 
( a ) , 501, 521 and 3101. 
Sertion 15 (g) of the Federal Agricul-
tural Marke t ing Act, referred to in subd. 
( j) (8) (C) , is compiled in the United 
S ta tes Code as Tit . 12, § 1141 j (g ) . 
The 1043 amendment added subd. ( j ) 
(6) ( Q ) ; and made a minor change in style 
in subd. ( j ) (2) ( B ) . 
The 1947 amendment added subd. ( j ) 
(6) ( R ) ; deleted a reference to sections 3 
(b) and 4 (e) in subd. (p) ( 1 ) ; subst i tuted 
"employment during any calendar year, is 
paid after December 31, 1940, and prior to 
J a n u a r y 1, 19 J7, fo such individual by 
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(i) Admits, as regular students only, individuals having a 
certificate of graduation from a high school, or the recognized 
equivalent of a certificate; 
(ii) Is legally authorized in this state to provide a program 
of education beyond high school; 
(iii) Provides an educational program for which it awards a 
bachelor's or higher degree, or provides a program which is 
acceptable for full credit toward that degree, a program of 
post-graduate or post-doctoral studies, or a program of train-
ing to prepare students for gainful employment in a recog-
nized occupation; and 
(iv) Is a public or other nonprofit institution. 
(B) All colleges and universities in this state are institutions of 
higher education for purposes of this section. 
(i) "Employer" means: 
(1) Any employing unit which paid wages during a calendar quarter 
in either the current or preceding calendar year for employment 
amounting to $140 or more and any employing unit subject to the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act, or which, as a condition for approval 
of this act for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act, is required, under the act, to be an "em-
ployer". 
(2) Any employing unit which, having become an employer under 
paragraph (1), has not, under §§ 35-4-5 and 35-4-8, ceased to be an 
employer subject to this act; or, 
(3) For the effective period of its election under Subsection 35-4-8(c) 
any other employing unit which has elected to become fully subject to 
this act. 
(j) (1) "Employment" means any service performed prior to January 1, 
1972, which was employment as defined in the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law prior to the effective date of this act, and subject to 
the other provisions of this subsection, service performed after Decem-
ber 31, 1971, including service in interstate commerce, and service as 
an officer of a corporation performed for wages or under any contract of 
hire written or oral, express or implied. 
(2) "Employment" includes an individual's entire service performed 
within or both within and without this state if: 
(A) The service is localized in this state; 
(B) The service is not localized in any state but some of the 
service is performed in this state and the individual's base of oper-
ations, or, if there is no base of operations, the place from which 
the service is directed or controlled, is in this state; or the individ-
ual's base of operations or place from which the service is directed 
or controlled is not in any state in which some part of the service is 
performed but the individual's residence is in this state; 
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(iv) For the purposes of this subparagraph (J), "crew leader" 
means an individual who: 
(I) Furnishes individuals to perform service in agricul-
tural labor for any other person; 
(II) Pays, either on his own behalf or on behalf of the 
other person, the individuals so furnished by him for the 
service in agricultural labor performed by them; and 
(III) Has not entered into a written agreement with the 
other person under which the individual is designated as 
an employee of the other person. 
(K) The service is domestic service performed after December 
31, 1977, in a private home, local college club, or local chapter of a 
college fraternity or sorority performed for a person who paid cash 
remuneration of $1,000 or more after December 31, 1977, in the 
current calendar year or the preceding calendar year to individ-
uals employed in the domestic service in any calendar quarter. 
(3) (A) Services covered by an election under Subsection 35-4-8(c), 
and 
(B) Services covered by an arrangement under § 35-4-21 be-
tween the commission and the agency charged with the adminis-
tration of any other state or federal unemployment compensation 
law, under which all services performed by an individual for an 
employing unit are deemed to be performed entirely within this 
state, are deemed to be employment if the commission has ap-
proved an election of the employing unit for whom the services are 
performed, under which the entire service of the individual during 
the period covered by the election is deemed to be insured work. 
(4) Service is deemed to be localized within a state if: 
(A) The service is performed entirely within the state; or 
(B) The service is performed both within and without the state, 
but the service performed without the state is incidental to the 
individual's service within the state, for example, is temporary or 
transitory in nature or consists of isolated transactions. 
(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any con-
tract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are deemed to be 
employment subject to this act unless and until it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the commission that: 
(A) The individual has been and will continue to be free from 
control or direction over the performance of those services, both 
under his contract of hire and in fact; and 
(B) The individual is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same 
nature as that involved in the contract of service. 
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(I) "Fund" means the unemployment compensation fund established by 
this act. 
(m) "Unemployment." (1) An individual is deemed "unemployed" in ar\v 
week during which he performs no services and with respect to which 
no wages are payable to him, or in any week of less than full-time work 
if the wages payable to him with respect to the week are less than his 
weekly benefit amount. The commission shall prescribe regulations 
applicable to unemployed individuals making distinctions in the proce-
dure as to total unemployment, part-total unemployment, partial un-
employment of individuals attached to their regular jobs, and other 
forms of short-time work, as the commission deems necessary. 
(2) The commission in its discretion may by regulation prescribe, in 
the case of individuals working on a regular attachment basis, the 
existence of unemployment for periods longer than a week, provided, 
that (i) it is a period of less than full-time work; (ii) insofar as possible 
the loss of wages required as a condition of being deemed "unem-
ployed" in those periods shall be such as to allow comparable benefits, 
for comparable loss in wages, to those individuals working less than 
full-time in each week as would be payable on a weekly claim period 
basis to those individuals working full-time and not at all in alternate 
weeks; and (iii) unemployment shall in no case be measured on a basis 
of longer than a four week period, 
(n) "State" includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the District of 
Columbia. The Virgin Islands shall be included effective on the day after 
the day on which the U.S. Secretary of Labor approves for the first time 
under Section 3304 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 an unemploy-
ment compensation law submitted to the Secretary by the Virgin Islands 
for approval. 
(o) "Employment Security Administration Fund" means the Employ-
ment Security Administration Fund established by § 35-4-14, and from 
which administrative expenses under this act shall be paid. 
(rj) "Wages" means all remuneration for personal services, including 
commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any 
medium other than cash. Gratuities customarily received by an individual 
in the course of his employment from persons other than his employing unit 
are treated as wages received from his employing unit. The reasonable cash 
value of remuneration in any medium other than cash and the reasonable 
amount of gratuities shall be estimated and determined in accordance with 
rules prescribed by the commission; provided, that "wages" shall not in-
clude: 
(1) For the purpose of § 35-4-7, that part of the remuneration which 
is as follows: 
(A) In excess of $3,000 paid to an individual by an employer 
with respect to employment subject to this act during any calendar 
year prior to calendar year 1964; 
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